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
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EICHMANN ON THE AIR: RADIO AND THE MAKING OF AN HISTORIC TRIAL

Amit Pinchevski, Tamar Liebes and
Ora Herman

Introduction

In his book *Justice in Jerusalem*, Gideon Hausner provides a detailed account on the prosecution and sentencing of SS Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann by an Israeli court tribunal in 1961. As chief prosecutor, Hausner focuses mainly on the legal aspects of the trial with only occasional references to its impact outside the courtroom. Among such references, his depiction of listening to radio broadcasts from the trial clearly stands out:

The radio (we had no television) provided a very wide coverage, with the main features of the trial broadcast directly from the courtroom. People would often close their shops to listen; bus and taxi drivers were reported to have stopped their vehicles when the proceedings grew too moving. School children brought transistor radios to school, and the teachers had to stop work from time to time to allow group listening. The proceedings could be heard in the public streets, for the radio voices emerged from every open window.¹

While Hausner himself was obviously not among the regular radio audience, his words may nevertheless testify to a common perception, which casts radio as the principal medium through which the Israeli public had experienced the Eichmann trial. It should be noted at the outset that in the early 1960s, radio was the only broadcasting medium operating in Israel (television became available only seven years

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later, in 1968).² The main radio station at the time was Kol Yisrael ('the Voice of Israel'), then a subdivision in the Prime Minister's Office. The primacy of radio in Israeli public life during those years can hardly be overestimated.³ Even today, for many Israelis the most vivid memory associated with the trial is listening to court sessions on the radio—particularly to live broadcasts—on a daily basis.

The Eichmann trial has been designated by several historians and critics as a 'show trial,' following, in one way or another, the views presented by Hannah Arendt in her famous book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil*.⁴ This observation is bolstered by the fact that the trial had taken place in a theater venue in the presence of cameras and microphones. While subsequent studies continue to debate the political and ideological goals behind the trial, one point seems to be in consensus: that radio had a key role in bringing the trial to public consciousness and in making it an indelible event in Israeli collective memory.⁵ What is usually taken for granted by most is that Israeli radio, as an extension of the government, had been essentially Prime Minister Ben Gurion's mouthpiece. References to radio in previous studies remain nevertheless marginal and practically none take the effort of actually examining its role during the time of the trial.

Based on original documents, correspondence and memos from that period, this study proposes to consider the various concerns and agendas among radio executives, public relations officers and the Israeli government. The information gathered from these documents reveals some of the intricacies behind the publicity of the trial. The main contention is that it would be inaccurate to frame Israeli radio's role as merely subservient to Ben Gurion's government. As opposed to previous accounts, which tend to regard radio as a mere propaganda tool, this study argues that while maintaining loyalty to the government, Kol Yisrael also pursued its own professional goals, competing with other media agencies in seeking coverage of the proceedings. As such, Israeli radio might be regarded as a semi-autonomous player operating among other players working on and around the production of the Eichmann trial. Thus while radio had shaped the way Israelis experienced the trial, this was not a consequence of a premeditated propaganda scheme.

This study also aims to shed new light on one of the most frequently mentioned—yet mostly understudied—issues in this trial: live radio transmissions from the courtroom. It is proposed that these live transmissions were more a product of Kol Yisrael's initiative than a government prescription. Furthermore, contrary to common belief, according to which live broadcasts were recurring daily events, there is evidence to suggest that such broadcasts were significantly less frequent. This piece of information may consequently open up a set of questions with respect to the way the trial has come to be remembered and represented in Israeli culture and society.

Justice to be seen and justice to be done

In many respects, the Eichmann trial was an exceptional legal procedure, involving a number of contradictory concerns for the Israeli government and legal system to wrestle with. These concerns, in turn, constituted the context in which Israeli public relations officers managed media coverage of the proceedings.

A major concern in the publicity of the trial was establishing Israel's right to put Eichmann on trial in accordance with the Israeli law. This was of particular importance in countering criticism on the kidnapping of Eichmann and in thwarting initiatives to put him on trial before an international tribunal. Yet at the same time, the trial presented Israeli government with a rare opportunity to make a powerful impact on domestic and international public opinion. It presented an occasion to remind the world of the catastrophe that befell the Jews and introduce the State of Israel as the main advocate for historic justice and as the ultimate guarantor for the safety of Jews after the Holocaust. Haim Yachil, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underscored the political significance of the trial in an internal briefing to Israeli consulates in April 1961:

First is the redemptive function of the State of Israel as the country where every Jew has a place; . . . Second is this State as claiming the wrong done to its people and as sentencing those who injured the life and rights of the nation . . . And I truly put the Eichmann trial, without any exaggeration, as a great tragic symbol of that harsh reckoning between us and our assailants who sought to annihilate us on a par with the act of redemption, the Aliya, and the integration of the people of Israel in its land.⁶

In this spirit, Israeli representatives were instructed to portray the trial as a turning point in Jewish history, thereby harnessing it to Israel's current national agendas, particularly to the ongoing efforts to reaffirm the State of Israel as the Jewish homeland.

The most visible figure in the Israeli prosecution team was undoubtedly Attorney General Gideon Hausner (Figure 1). In Hannah Arendt's report, he is typecast as a demagogue with little to offer beyond theatrics, whose enthusiasm had to be occasionally curbed by the judges (to whom she expressed much esteem) in order to prevent the proceedings 'from becoming a show trial under the prosecutor's love of showmanship'.⁷ The true architect behind this trial, according to Arendt, was none other than Ben Gurion: remaining the 'invisible stage manager of the proceedings', he nevertheless commanded through the voice of Hausner, 'who does his best, his very best, to obey his master'.⁸ Hausner had indeed a flare for the dramatic, but his role in this trial could hardly be reduced to a mere puppet in the hands of the Prime Minister. Contrary to Arendt's conspiratorial view, he might be better characterized as the embodiment of the trial's dilemmas and ambiguities.

For Hausner, the trial was not only about convicting a Nazi criminal but also about reconciliation with the tragic past. Although it was clear to him that the documents collected by the Israeli Police would have been sufficient to secure a conviction, Hausner decided to call as many as 110 witnesses to appear before the court. As he explains: 'I knew we needed more than a conviction; we needed a living record of the gigantic human and national disaster . . .'⁹ He thus regarded the trial as having an educational purpose:

I wanted our people at home to know as many of the facts of the great disaster as could be legitimately conveyed through these proceedings. It was imperative



FIGURE 1 Attorney General Gideon Hausner (standing); sitting close on the left, defense attorney Robert Servatius (photograph by John Milli, copyright Israel Government Press Office).

for the stability of our youth that they should learn the full truth of what had happened.¹⁰

And there was also the world at large, which, according to Hausner, 'had so lightly and happily forgotten the horrors that had occurred before its eyes'. Through the trial, the world was to be reminded 'with as much detail as possible, of the gigantic human tragedy, which is an ineradicable part of a century with unlimited possibilities of both good and evil'.¹¹

Hausner appears here as a capable dramaturge, highly aware of the stage and the diverse audiences being addressed. In his view, the Nuremberg trials failed to reach the hearts of people precisely because almost no living witnesses had appeared before the court. His belief was that the combined effect of various narratives, as related by different witnesses (many of whom had been personally interviewed and coached by him), would render the tragedy more tangible: 'In this way I hoped to superimpose on a phantom a dimension of reality'.¹² Moreover, the trial's sessions were planned to offer peaks of tragedy interspersed with plateaus of routine, where procedural or other technical issues were to be debated. The assumption behind this strategy was that the public's emotions would be overly stretched by

exposure to a constant dramatic high. As he elaborates in an internal briefing to Israeli consulates:

We are facing a trial which is almost entirely a horror story, without releasing tension, without one comic relief . . . we should nevertheless present it to the Israeli public so that people will not shy away from the issue. I fear that now, years later, absorbing the horrific episodes over a period of three or four weeks would make the audience feel the same escapism that was felt so far about the Holocaust and they will not want to know.¹³

Yet on the other hand, there was the opposite concern: that courthouse drama would set off emotional outbursts, bringing individuals or groups to take the law into their own hands. Speaking at a conference organized by the Information Center at the Prime Minister's Office a month into the trial, Hausner is quoted as saying:

In my opinion, what didn't happen is more important than what did. Lo and behold, a trial is taking place in Jerusalem against a person whose indictment states that he is responsible for the extermination of one third of the people, and the trial is taking place quietly. There was one outburst of a man who later settled down . . . No need for special security measures to disperse protests, no need to recruit forces to protect the courthouse, defense attorney and prosecutor.¹⁴

Concern about public reaction went therefore in two opposite directions—escapism on the one hand, and violent outbreaks, on the other. For Hausner the challenge was to navigate the trial between intense drama and tedious procedure; moving toward either extreme would undermine its ultimate purpose.

It was the Kasztner trial, which took place from 1954 to 1958, that first introduced the tragedy of Holocaust survivors to public debate in Israel.¹⁵ Like the Eichmann trial, it was also harnessed to serve an extra-legal goal: to undermine the Mapai ruling party by casting Kasztner's negotiations with Nazi officers as collaboration with the executioner.¹⁶ The assassination of Kasztner and the political turmoil that ensued revealed the contentious terrain of Holocaust memory in Israel of the late 1950s. This affair would shape Holocaust memory in Israel in the years to come. As opposed to the divisive Kasztner trial, the Eichmann trial was undertaken with a unifying purpose: it was to forestall any historical controversy and bring Israelis of different origins into the fold of nationhood. Prosecuting an ex-German officer could have also caused damage to the delicate relations between Israel and post World-War Germany, which at the time was still completing the compensation agreement signed with the Israeli government in 1952. There was some reason for concern that investigations might lead to incumbent German officials (particularly in the case of Hans Globke, Adenauer's right-hand) thereby putting the German Chancellor's ministry in a difficult position.¹⁷ This concern is manifested in Prime Minister Ben Gurion's comments on the opening speech, given to him for review by Hausner (in utter disregard of legal practice) shortly before the trial commenced. 'Each time mention is made of what Germany did to us', writes Ben Gurion, 'I think mention should be made of *Nazi Germany*'.¹⁸ These political constraints demanded that the trial be focused solely on the Nazi perpetrator, namely, that evil be confined to the

person sitting in the glass booth. In practice, this meant averting the question of Jewish collaborators, on the one hand, and distinguishing Nazi Germany from Israel's ally 'the other Germany', on the other.

As public prosecutor, Hausner's aim was to persuade the court and, in so doing, to persuade public opinion; as he recounts in his book, 'It was a court of law we were facing, with the whole world as the audience'.¹⁹ As will be shown shortly, the media played a vital role as the trial unfolded, bringing images and sounds from within the courtroom to audiences both local and international. But media involvement also accentuated the discrepancies of the trial, specifically the challenge of reconciling the legal procedure with the introduction of microphones and cameras into the courtroom.

Historical record between image and sound

Preparations for the trial began shortly after Prime Minister Ben Gurion's announcement at the Knesset of Eichmann's kidnapping on May 23, 1960.²⁰ Teddy Kollek, the Prime Minister's bureau chief, was in charge of supervising all administrative aspects of the trial, including public relations.²¹ One of the first issues was finding an appropriate venue for holding the proceedings. Assuming that the trial would attract a worldwide attention, organizers chose Beit Ha'am ('the People's Hall'), a Jerusalem theater house of 800 seats that was nearing completion; it was this venue that Hannah Arendt would later invoke as the setting of what she called a 'show trial'.²² From the outset, special attention was given to the press and media coverage. David Landor, the director of the Government Press Office, outlined the key points as early as two weeks after the announcement of Eichmann's capture. Among the issues raised by Landor: allocating seats for journalists, photographers and cameramen in the courtroom; setting up television transmission to an outside venue; arranging for radio transmission and recording by Kol Yisrael; and preparing on-site press rooms and press facilities. Initial suggestions also included publishing a book on the trial, initiating a production of a documentary film, and even speculating on future collaboration with movie producers.²³

While being the main broadcasting medium at the time, Kol Yisrael had a rather marginal role in the consultations that took place before the trial. Radio representatives were not invited to attend the meetings of an interministerial committee responsible for the publicity of the trial chaired by Landor. 'I read in the newspaper about the composition of the special committee handling the Eichmann affair', wrote Zvi Zinder, Director General of Kol Yisrael, to Landor. According to Zinder, since no arrangements had been made to appear before the committee, his memo was to specify the demands of the Israeli radio service.²⁴ The two main tasks as designated by Zinder were recording the trial from beginning to end and providing updates for Kol Yisrael's newscasts. These tasks were ultimately to be achieved, though not without some serious debates.

Requests to record the proceedings were initially ignored by Major General Yekutiel Keren, Israel Police commissioner who was appointed as chief administrator of the trial. Hanoch Givton, Zinder's successor as Director General of Kol Yisrael, followed his predecessor in claiming permission to record the trial, this time stressing

the significance of a complete tape-recording, not merely for the benefit of broadcasting, but mainly for 'safekeeping in the State's archive or in other national institute', adding that 'It would be an irretrievable loss if for whatever reason such voice document would not be preserved by the State and the Jewish people'.²⁵ These requests had remained largely unanswered, and it took Teddy Kollek's intervention to bring Keren to finally concede.²⁶ This was following the disconcerting realization that Capital Cities Broadcasting Corporation, a New York-based film company hired by the Israeli government, was not obliged by contract to capture the entire trial on film and therefore could not provide a complete record of the proceedings.²⁷ Kol Yisrael's mandate to record the Eichmann trial was thus more of a last-minute solution than forethought. However, the story of radio's role in the Eichmann trial would be incomplete without looking into the affairs surrounding the hiring of Capital Cities, which vividly demonstrate the Israeli government's perception of the trial and of its publicity, as well as revealing the goings-on of politicians, legal system officials and public relations officers.

As noted above, the possibility of filming the trial had been discussed as early as two weeks after the announcement of Eichmann's kidnapping.²⁸ The issue of allowing cameras into the courtroom was nevertheless a source of contention among different branches of the government and legal system. Since television broadcasts became available in Israel only in 1968, television coverage would have been of no consequence to the local audience. When the idea of filming the proceedings was first introduced, the purpose was providing an archival record rather than a source for regular reportage. Furthermore, Israeli public relations officers were concerned predominantly with the printed press, while being either indifferent to or unaware of television's status in America and Europe. A few months before proceedings commenced, the director of the Government Press Office was still expressing his concern over the limited registration of major U.S. newspapers for covering the trial.²⁹ Preoccupation with the printed press was soon to be taken over by negotiations with the broadcasting media, largely due to the intervention of some major international media networks.

Opposition to allowing cameras in the courtroom was heard from the outset, coming mainly from the legal system, the Minister of Justice Pinchas Rosen, in particular.³⁰ The anxiety is clearly evident in the words of the legal consultant to the Foreign Minister:

...until now there has been no case of television within the walls of an Israeli courtroom. The question arises whether the Eichmann trial is the proper occasion for such a novelty in our legal life. Supposing the defense will do everything to discredit the entire trial, are we not giving it here additional material gratis to establish its claim that the whole thing is merely propaganda and not a trial of justice?³¹

Indeed, Eichmann's attorney Robert Servatius did appeal the issue, albeit on somewhat different grounds, claiming that such an exposure would be to his client's disadvantage. His argument was that the presence of cameras might encourage witnesses to perform rather than testify, and that they might also feel compelled to stick to versions previously told for fear of being proven dishonest by their families

and friends.³² Nevertheless, opposition was ultimately outweighed by other voices that advocated the benefit of full exposure. Among the supporters was chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner, who emphasized the historic significance of the trial for generations to come, invoking the Nuremberg trials as a legal precedent. In his account, the court overruled Servatius's objections and ordered 'the entire proceedings to be filmed for television purposes, so that the whole world could watch'.³³ Filming was authorized under strict conditions: cameras were to be located in three concealed corners of the hall, special noise-reduction measures were to be taken, and the presence of cameramen in the courthouse was to be kept minimal. However, as Hanna Yablonka notes, the rationale supplied by the judges was purely pragmatic: 'The widest possible publicity given to the legal process, which makes the court accessible to public evaluation, is the best possible means of ensuring that justice and judgment are done without bias or prejudice'.³⁴ Their concern was thus the propriety of the legal process rather than the place it would take in history.

In October 1960, government representatives commenced negotiation (without any preliminary bidding process) with Milton Fruchtman, a young producer working for Capital Cities. Fruchtman, an ex-Israeli who emigrated to the U.S. in 1956, was also the husband of Minister of Justice Pinchas Rosen's niece, a fact that may or may not have had anything to do with him being hired by the Israeli government to film the trial.³⁵ Word on the ongoing negotiations had probably reached network executives in the United States, among them chief producer at NBC Chet Hagen, who approached Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir with a proposal for coverage of the trial for NBC television and radio news. His offer included preparing a series of exclusive reports, which were to be accomplished by installing television cameras in the courtroom, promising to 'build a soundproof booth . . . so that we would not interfere with the dignity of the court'.³⁶ Hagen estimated the cost of this project at 1 million US dollars, which involved the shipping of special equipment and a staff of 15–20 employees. He did not hide his frustration with the way negotiations had been managed so far:

We urge that the Israeli government NOT finalize arrangements for the broadcasting coverage of the Eichmann trial until we have had a full opportunity to discuss this matter with the proper authorities in Israel. Mr. Ben Gurion has said that this is to be a 'trial for history' and it will be just that with the full coverage we can give it . . .³⁷

The terms dictated by the Israeli representatives for the filming of the trial were unquestionably strict: all copies were to be released simultaneously to all interested parties on an equal basis, price of copies was to be fixed and controlled, and the entire record was to be handed to the government at the end of the procedure. Defined as 'public service', profits were to be donated to charity.³⁸ These terms stipulate, in effect, that coverage of the Eichmann trial was not to be traded or benefited from, at least not in the commercial sense. Fruchtman, on his part, was able to convince the executives in his company that such involvement would contribute to Capital Cities' prestige and comply with American regulations that a certain percentage of annual production be declared as public service.³⁹ While government representatives were striking a deal with Fruchtman, further demands to permit court coverage were made

by various international media agencies, but to no avail. 'The court could not be persuaded to allow more than one TV crew', wrote Givton to director of the European Broadcasting Union following a request for additional coverage. His words reveal the discontent with the hiring of Fruchtman and Capital Cities:

We are not very happy with the TV arrangements on grounds of principle, but considering that we ourselves could not undertake the work and the ruling of the judiciary in which the Government has no say, it seems that the Government Press Office offers the best possible practical solution.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the success of a relatively unknown company led by a person of questionable credibility brought some media agencies to take an active role in trying to overturn the Israeli government's decision. In an unprecedented move, chief executives of three leading American broadcasting networks ABC, CBS and NBC, joined forces and proposed to establish a users' pool which would serve all interested parties on an equal basis.⁴¹ The idea was put forward to Israeli representatives in the U.S. and simultaneously to Jewish leaders in America. American journalist Reuven Frank pleaded the case with the Israeli Ambassador to the U.N., commenting that the company with which the Israeli government had made the arrangements 'has no recorded experience in handling an undertaking of this size and nature', adding that according to his information, that company 'did not possess the necessary television camera equipment, or television tape equipment, nor had they yet arranged for any'.⁴² A final plea for permitting another camera crew in the courtroom was lodged when the networks realized that Capital Cities was renting videotape equipment, which was incompatible with their predominantly film apparatus.⁴³ As pressure was mounting, the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. reported to his superiors back home:

We have encountered deep and serious outrage from networks' executives . . . they have worked tens of Jewish connections to put pressure on us, and the matter has become the talk of town both in Washington and in New York, with the telephone not ceasing to ring and different people asking: what did you do to upset NBC and ABC so much?

Warning against possible fallout between the networks and Israeli representatives, he concludes, 'I don't know if we can afford something like that in the long run. After all, we do depend on them to a large extent regardless of the Eichmann affair . . .'⁴⁴

While these deliberations had little relevance for the Israeli audience, one idea did carry a promise for Israelis to watch the trial by means of television transmissions to movie theaters and clubs in the Tel Aviv area. The initiative came from Zvi Zinder, now head of the Central Office of Information. Turning to NBC, he asked the network to supply technical apparatus for the transmission of a two-hour videotape of each day's session for the general public. The idea was

. . . to give the people of Israel the same facilities to *see* the trial as are given to television audiences in the United States and Europe. Otherwise, the people here

will have to depend on newsreel clips which will be put on a week late and will lack the every-day drama of the trial.⁴⁵

The initial plan involved 15 movie houses and 25 clubs around the Tel Aviv area, where videotape recording could be watched for a nominal price of 1 IL. NBC was promised credit for its participation and also a possible business prospect: 'I need not stress here that if we are successful, this will be the clincher for TV in Israel'.⁴⁶ The initiative was ultimately rejected for a more conservative option that included a closed-circuit television transmission to a venue close to the Beit Ha'am.⁴⁷ The nearby Ratisbon monastery was chosen as an outside hall and Fruchtman was asked to complete the installation. Zinder's assumption that Israelis would at least be able to watch segments of the trial in newsreels also failed to fully materialize. There were only about 100 newsreel copies available for movie theaters countrywide, which meant that most moviegoers could watch them within two weeks from distribution; in addition, the quality of film copies reproduced from the video original was often in poor quality.⁴⁸ Screenings at Ratisbon were equally problematic: the 600-seat hall was evidently too small, and those who were fortunate enough to find a seat were asked from time to time to evacuate the hall in order to allow others to watch the transmission, which also suffered from technical difficulties.⁴⁹

In sum, while entrusting the coverage of the trial with a nonaligned company may have been a prudent idea, particularly in order to avoid over-commercialization of the legal procedure, its execution was certainly inept. At any rate, the reasons for the government's insistence on hiring Fruchtman for the job remain largely vague. More puzzling still is the government's reluctance to consider proposals of local studios, which promised to accomplish the same goals under the same conditions at considerably lower costs.⁵⁰ Whatever the reasons, the result was however clear: the lack of visual coverage meant that Israelis saw relatively little of the proceedings during the time of the trial. This fact is crucial to understanding the significance of the trial in Israeli collective memory and the role of radio therein. The lack of visual media was the context of radio's impact—the drama of the trial was to be carried by sound rather than sight.

The trial in the ears of the world

Kol Yisrael's three main tasks during the trial were: complete and continuous recording of the proceedings, daily reports and live broadcasts for the Israeli audience, and service to foreign correspondents assigned to cover the trial. These tasks presented an unprecedented technical challenge, entailing the construction of a small radio station inside Beit Ha'am, complete with specially purchased equipment. The undertaking was described in detail in Kol Yisrael's weekly magazine *Radio*, published regularly in the early 1960s. A feature article, entitled 'The Trial in the Ears of the World', which appeared two weeks before the trial commenced, unfolds the technical operation behind it. For those involved in the operation, the aim was to allow 'everyone who wishes to be present in the trial of the Jewish people against one of its greatest deadly foes, to participate in all but physical presence in what was repeatedly described as one of the greatest trials in our generation'.⁵¹ The article, which clearly




FIGURE 2 View of the courtroom from the control booth (courtesy of Kol Yisrael archive).

bespeaks Kol Yisrael's agenda, offers some revealing details on the way the trial was perceived by Israeli radio executives.

For one thing, it declares that technical preparations for the trial had begun a few days after the announcement of Eichmann's capture and were carried out and completed as planned (quite an achievement given the general ineptitude demonstrated by other agencies dealing with the publicity of the trial).⁵² 'It is possible that the courtroom would tend to remind us of the hall's original purpose—cinema and artistic performance', comments the reporter, 'but the eye immediately encounters the court's podium; and the staff's stern faces would instantly thwart any possible mistake by a passerby'.⁵³ Kol Yisrael's technical preparations further manifest the precariousness surrounding a legal procedure taking place in a theater house and exposed to worldwide press and media. By special permission of the Minister of Justice, eight microphones were installed in the courtroom (one for each judge, prosecution, defense, witness stand, interpreter, and accused) and were wired simultaneously to the loudspeaker system, to earphones inside the hall, and to Kol Yisrael's transmission booth. Adjacent to the transmission booth and overlooking the entire hall was the control booth, from which a technician activated each speaker's microphone (Figures 2 and 3). The 'nerve center' was located on the bottom floor of the building, where five mini-studios were set to serve 32 foreign stations and networks, working continuously 24 hours a day with the capacity of relaying up to eight overseas transmissions an hour (Figure 4). In the prose of *Radio's* reporter, Kol Yisrael's technicians were entrusted with a mission exceeding the technical challenge: 'And here—in these tiny studios and cramped rooms they will have to mix and broadcast and cable the message of the trial to all corners of the world'.⁵⁴

While permission had been given to the setting up of a microphone system and to the complete recording of the proceedings, the Ministry of Justice stipulated that no tape-recorders were to be allowed inside the courtroom.⁵⁵ Such restriction would have undoubtedly impaired the work of many correspondents wanting to incorporate



FIGURES 3 AND 4 Equipment in the control booth (left) and in the 'nerve center' (right).

voice inserts in their reports. The problem was solved by the construction of an elaborate system of distribution, specifically designed to facilitate recording while respecting the legal stipulation. The system featured an innovative apparatus—'recording taps'—which enabled reporters to plug-in, listen and record the procedures without interfering with the formal conduct of the trial. Fifty units of 'recording taps' were installed in a working area at the rear of the hall, from which correspondents could follow the proceedings in the translation language of their choice (Hebrew, German, English or French) while recording the original signal from the hall (Figure 5). The 'recording taps' system supplied a technical solution to a dilemma that accompanied the trial from the very beginning: wanting to expose the proceedings to the media and at the same time to protect the proceedings from the media. In this case, however, a technological solution was enough to resolve the contradiction between accessibility and formality.

As the title of *Radio's* feature article suggests, the belief of radio executives was that the whole world was listening. The joint effort of technicians, producers and reporters was 'to fulfill the wish of thousands and of millions, to be something like "living conduits", virtually without mediation, to the voices and the sounds—to the facts of the trial'.⁵⁶ Accordingly, Kol Yisrael's mission was to serve not only Israeli listeners but a worldwide audience by relaying the event as authentically and faithfully as possible. Nakdimon Rogel, the head of the Operations Department in Kol Yisrael, is quoted as commenting on the role of modern media in the making of world events:

The development of communication media has canceled notions of time and space with respect to reporting events of international importance. The summit meeting, the last Olympics in Rome, and the trial of the American pilot Francis Powers in Moscow, have reached millions of readers, radio listeners and television



FIGURE 5 Reporters in the pressroom inside Beit Ha'am.

viewers, as if they had taken place in front of their very eyes and not thousands of kilometers away from their homes.⁵⁷

Unlike others dealing with the publicity of the trial, Rogel seemed to have grasped its significance precisely as an event that takes place on the air as much as in a Jerusalem venue—or in other words, as a media event.⁵⁸ Consequently, the fidelity of the broadcast was not only a matter of professional prestige but also a matter of political implication. In line with the court's decision, media coverage was not deemed inappropriate but rather as serving 'important values of doing justice'.⁵⁹ From this perspective, broadcasting was not seen as invalidating the legal procedure. On the contrary—in the eyes of Kol Yisrael's executives, radio coverage served to ascertain that what was taking place in Beit Ha'am was a fair and just legal procedure, a bona fide trial. Some critics (Hannah Arendt for one) would later invoke the exposure of the proceeding to the media in arguing that this court case was in fact a show trial. For those responsible for the broadcasting of the trial, however, such exposure meant precisely the opposite; that is, corroborating rather than jeopardizing the integrity of the proceedings.

Radio broadcasting of the trial

Historians and critics have often mentioned Israeli radio as having a predominant role in making the Eichmann trial a formative event in Israeli history. Indeed, it was through the radio that most Israelis had encountered personal testimonies of Holocaust survivors for the first time.⁶⁰ As Tom Segev notes, 'much of the trial was carried live on the radio; everywhere, people listened—in houses and offices, in cafés and stores and buses and factories'.⁶¹ Shoshana Felman adds that 'Broadcast live over

the radio and passionately listened to, the trial was becoming the central event in the country's life'.⁶² Idith Zertal states that: 'The trial, the full sessions of which were broadcast live on national radio, changed the face of Israel, psychologically binding the pastless young Israelis with their recent history and revolutionizing their self-perception'.⁶³ And according to Anita Shapira,

The Eichmann Trial was *the* most important media event in Israel prior to the Six Day War . . . The transistor radio became consumer item number one across the country. Young and old could be seen radio in hand everywhere—in constant earshot of the broadcast from Beit Ha'am.⁶⁴

What these and other accounts emphasize is that the trial was broadcast and listened to *live*, and that this 'liveness' somehow contributed to its turning into a national event. The experience of listening to the trial in real time has since pervaded the Israeli collective memory, becoming almost inseparable from the memory of the trial itself. However, further examination reveals that this common perception is largely unfounded. While several court sessions were indeed transmitted live on the radio—including some of the most moving and unsettling testimonies heard by the court—the bulk of trial was not broadcast live. In fact, such occasions were relatively rare.

In the early 1960s, Kol Yisrael's entire programming schedule was broadcast on a single radio channel, called Tochnit Aleph (Program A). It featured a wide variety of radio programs, ranging from radio drama to Hebrew lessons, newscasts and sportscasts. There was also a newly instituted channel called Ha'gal Ha'kal (Easy Listening), which featured light and popular music for four hours on each evening of the week. Clearly, the limited broadcasting resources required a considerable reorganization in radio's daily operations in order to accommodate coverage of the trial. Kol Yisrael's work-plan is specified in a special memo, entitled 'Operation Trial', issued two months before proceedings commenced.⁶⁵ First is the production of a 30-minute daily diary, *Yoman Ha'mishpat* ('Trial Diary'), scheduled for broadcast Monday through Thursday at 7:15 p.m.⁶⁶ The daily diaries were to be aired following the evening news, featuring a narrated summary of the day's proceedings combined with recordings from the courtroom, occasionally followed by commentaries of leading reporters. The next project specified in the memo is live broadcasts during the first days of the trial. It was later decided that additional sessions would be broadcast, in consultation with the Ministry of Justice. Interestingly, the memo stipulates that radio presenters should refrain from adding narration and allow any lapses or pauses that might occur during live transmission.⁶⁷ In other words, what presenters were instructed to do was to make themselves mute—that is, to suspend their professional practices—in order to sustain a greater sense of authenticity.

The daily diaries – Yoman Ha'mishpat

Whereas the issue of live broadcasts remained under deliberation well into trial, the preparation for the daily diary *Yoman Ha'mishpat* was underway weeks before the target day. An in-house production, it was Kol Yisrael's pride and emblem, introducing a leading news team of producers, reporters and commentators. No resources were

spared in supporting the production and execution of the broadcast, including the reassignment of senior reporters from their regular tasks in the news desk to work exclusively on the trial. As described in *Radio magazine* progress report,

By the beginning of the trial preparation and organization will be completed. The operation will now be carried out by the news and reportage desk . . . The producers of *Yoman Ha'mishpat* . . . will embark on a daily, arduous work of editing and mixing in two specially equipped studios.⁶⁸

In addition to personnel, programming schedule was also changed to include the Trial Diary. This meant that the main radio station operating in Israel at the time had to cancel programs which were among its standard broadcasts, such as: *You and the Law*, *Parents and Children*, *The Citizen Wants to Know* and *Gentlemen of the Press*.⁶⁹

Yoman Ha'mishpat was launched with two special broadcasts on April 9 and 10, which were to set the tone for the opening court sessions on the following days. The first program featured a street survey conducted in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on the 'meaning of the trial and the Holocaust for people of various social ranks', followed by a studio discussion with a historian, a philosopher and a Holocaust survivor. The second program was devoted to the legal procedures involved in the trial, featuring a discussion with legal experts, and concluding with interviews with Lord Bertrand Russell and other international intellectuals.⁷⁰ The day following the broadcast, Teddy Kollek, Ben Gurion's bureau chief, wrote to Kol Yisrael's Director General: 'Yesterday I listened to the first *Yoman Ha'mishpat* during my trip to Tel Aviv. In my opinion it was rather weak and lengthy—too bad. Please consider cutting it down by 15 minutes'.⁷¹ As the Prime Minister's bureau chief (whose responsibilities included overseeing Kol Yisrael's operations), Kollek was well within his capacity to express his discomfort with what he reckoned as inadequate, perhaps even excessive, coverage. Evidently, this was not serious enough a reservation since broadcasting of the Trial Diary proceeded as planned.

But a month later Kollek would present a different view. His initial reservation gave way to proactive involvement, aiming at harnessing the growing public interest in the trial to current political goals. Speaking at a conference on the publicity of the trial organized by the Information Center at the Prime Minister's Office, he stated:

About two weeks ago we met and the idea arose: shouldn't we take advantage of this trial, of the waves and echoes it creates, in order to instill some historic ideas deeper than what is done by the daily press and by Kol Yisrael, which is undertaking a tremendous task every day through news reportage, *Yoman Ha'mishpat* and the *Weekly News*.⁷²

At the same occasion, head of the Information Center commented: 'Like you, I was surprised by the excitement taking hold of the people'. He was addressing an audience of 400 lecturers hired by the Information Center to give talks around the county on the significance of the trial. Their mission was

. . . to bring the Holocaust, the Ghetto uprisings, and the trial itself, to those who are not of European origin and have not lost family in the Holocaust, and

maybe . . . to bring the Eichmann trial to Oriental communities and to those who are removed from it.⁷³

The task was to be achieved by interpersonal communication, in lectures and in meetings, taking advantage of the massive public interest that had been generated by radio broadcasts. And yet, this regrouping cannot hide the fact that Israeli officials were genuinely surprised by the overwhelming effect of radio broadcasts on the Israeli public.

The live broadcasts

While permission had been given to Kol Yisrael to record the proceedings, neither the court nor the Ministry of Justice had ever given any official permission for live transmission from the courtroom. The initiative, so it seems, came largely from within Kol Yisrael. Following the live broadcast of the opening session on April 11, it was announced that additional live broadcasts of sessions 'of special significance' were forthcoming.⁷⁴ The initial decision was to transmit live sessions dealing with the Warsaw Ghetto, the concentration and extermination camps, and Hungarian Jewry.⁷⁵ In most cases, however, arrangements for live broadcasts had been finalized shortly before sessions took place, usually without any formal discussions being conducted in Kol Yisrael. This was mainly because radio producers depended on the Ministry of Justice for information on what was to be presented in each session as well as on the trial's line-up as a whole. Unofficially, information was also supplied to Kol Yisrael's Director General Hanoah Givon by his longtime friend and university classmate chief prosecutor Hausner, who had pointed out sessions of particular public interest.⁷⁶ It should be noted that at no point was there any thought of using the other channel available to Kol Yisrael—Ha'gal Ha'kal, which featured music in the early evening but was completely vacant during the days—for live coverage of the trial.⁷⁷ Broadcasting in real time was carried out exclusively on Kol Yisrael main channel, which meant the disruption of an already packed programming schedule.

Whereas the daily diary *Yoman Ha'mishpat* was the product of careful preparation and deliberation, the live broadcasts were largely carried out spontaneously and haphazardly, sometimes to the extent of professional incompetence.⁷⁸ Ironically, it was these live transmissions that have become the insignia of Kol Yisrael's achievement during the Eichmann trial. A listening survey, conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics immediately after the opening-day of the trial, confirms the popularity of the live broadcasts.⁷⁹ About 60% of the Jewish population over the age of 14 listened to the morning or afternoon sessions of the opening-day, that is, more than 700,000 people. Survey also shows that native Israelis were the largest group listening with 81.5%; listeners born in America or Europe measured at 73.4%; and the share of Asia and Africa-born listeners was estimated at 43.9%. While the latter group is markedly lower than the overall average, it should be remembered that many were newcomers who had little knowledge of the Holocaust, most had probably never heard Eichmann's name before learning of his capture by the Israeli security service. As noted above, involving those who were untouched by the Holocaust—especially newcomers from middle-eastern countries—was one of the main tasks of the Information Center at the Prime Minister's Office. Inasmuch as listening to the radio

on the opening-day indicates involvement in the trial, this was achieved with remarkable success.

Radio broadcast of the opening-day session made the headlines in Israeli newspapers of the following day: 'Israel from Dan to Eilat Listened to the Trial' (*Haboker*); 'Masses Eagerly Follow the Broadcast' (*Al Ha'mishmar*); 'People Nationwide Follow the Trial—Thousands Glued to Radio Receivers' (*Davar*); 'Cabinet Meeting Opened and Closed by Listening to Minister of Justice's Transistor Radio' (*Maariv*).⁸⁰ Top stories reported on empty streets throughout the country, on people gathering around the radio in restaurants, cafés and stores, and on school classes listening together to the broadcast from Beit Ha'am. *Haaretz* featured an item on a Tel Aviv doctor swamped by patients asking for a one-day sick leave; the cause of the sudden epidemic was soon revealed—they wanted to have a free day to listen to the trial on the radio.⁸¹ Another item reads:

Our correspondent from the Galilee reports that Arab residents of Acre also listened to the radio broadcast in offices and coffee houses. In schools, children were seen operating radio sets during the break. Jewish farmers carried radio receivers to their work on the field. Exceptional interest was reported among newcomers from North Africa in the town of Maalot. Amongst Holocaust survivors there was much anxiety. In a few cases, sedatives were administered.⁸²

As the trial was progressing, newspapers tended to focus more on the legal procedure and less on the public's reactions; likewise, headlines on nationwide radio hype would quickly fade away, never to repeat the excitement of the first days.

But the impact of the first days was not forgotten by the audience. The popularity of the live broadcasts is evident in many letters sent by listeners to Kol Yisrael. 'I would like to know why you discontinued broadcasting of the Eichmann Trial', asks a woman from Even Yehuda, 'I find that we have every right to hear how this criminal is being sentenced'.⁸³ Another listener writes:

I wonder why you *stopped broadcasting the trial on Kol Yisrael*, since I think thousands will be drawn to it every day... What will all those who are not fortunate enough to attend the trial do? At least we could listen to it on the radio.⁸⁴

And a woman from Jerusalem writes:

Allow me to express my deepest appreciation for your excellent broadcast of the Eichmann trial... Yet I must also express my regret that broadcasting did not continue to the next day... In our country, where television is nonexistent and radio is the primary means for conveying what is going on—and which citizens trust—I believe that your organization has the sacred duty of bringing the process of the trial in full.⁸⁵

Dozens of such letters demanding additional live coverage had been sent to Kol Yisrael during the four months of the trial.⁸⁶ Most were answered by spokesperson Hedva Rotem, whose replies were usually standard, stating that since court sessions took

place during the working hours of most people, radio service saw no justification for continual live broadcasts. This explanation is in line with Kol Yisrael's initial decision that live broadcasts were not to be carried out regularly but only when court events demanded live coverage. Moreover, bearing in mind that Kol Yisrael was the main broadcasting station in Israel at the time, undertaking continual broadcasts would have entailed abolishing a significant part of daily programming for a period of months. The many letters sent to Kol Yisrael are nevertheless a clear indication of the want of live coverage and of listeners' desire to hear more of the trial in real time on radio. Given this gap between supply and demand, it remains to be determined how many live broadcasts were actually aired.

In her reply to a listener sent on August 8, 1961, Rotem reveals a crucial detail: 'I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Kol Yisrael has broadcast until today 11 sessions live from the courthouse sentencing Eichmann'.⁸⁷ This number accounts for almost the entire duration of the trial—from the first court session on April 11 until almost the end of the trial on August 14. Since court usually held two sessions a day, morning and afternoon, it is possible that Rotem's count includes broadcasts of two sessions on the same day. Taking into account 4–5 additional live broadcasts that took place in the following months when verdict, sentencing and appeal were announced—the total number of broadcasts, at the highest estimate, would add up to no more than 16 broadcasts during a period of 13 months.⁸⁸ This fact stands in stark contrast to common perception—which is often reiterated by historians and commentators—that live broadcasts were an almost daily occurrence and that many court sessions were brought and listened to in real time on the radio.

It remains to be speculated how a series of sporadic events has since been registered in both history and memory of the trial as a daily practice. This question deserves a separate study on the complex mechanism involved in the construction of collective memory, a study which remains beyond the scope of the present one. Still, it is possible to propose at this point two, possibly interrelated, tentative explanations. The first suggests that while live broadcasts were indeed sporadic, public perception was of an ongoing event, of a continuously unfolding reality, and this perception may have inflated the status of live broadcasts in Israeli collective memory. In other words, the assumption (in retrospect) is that an event of such magnitude *must have been* broadcast live on a daily basis, which might also explain the consensus among historians on the role of radio during the trial. The second explanation suggests that the daily diaries were enough to create a sense of a live event while the actual live broadcasts only supplemented the effect of liveness. This would mean that what is perceived as a live broadcast is a matter of historical context—that what audiences had experienced as 'live' then might not be the same as what audiences experience nowadays. These and other speculations await further deliberation and examination.

Conclusion

In more than one way, the role of radio in the Eichmann trial reflects the conflicting agendas of those involved in its conception, realization and promotion. First and foremost was the contradiction between utilizing the trial for invoking the lessons of the Holocaust in Israel and across the world, while at the same time ensuring that

the trial proceeds as a valid legal procedure—and is seen as such. Media coverage was thus deemed necessary for achieving certain ideological goals, but, concomitantly, reckoned as a threat to the propriety of the proceedings. Likewise, while the declared objective was to engage the Israeli public in an event of historic magnitude, there were deep concerns that extensive coverage might either set off violent outbursts or, conversely, desensitize the public. There was also anxiety about reawakening sore memories from the Kasztner trial as well as worry about jeopardizing the delicate relations with Adenauer's Germany. Add together, these inconsistencies did not provide a favorable context for devising a viable publicity strategy. There is reason to suspect that decisions on media coverage did not follow from a carefully planned strategy but rather from vacillating between contradictory demands. Put differently, media policy in the Eichmann trial followed the path of least resistance; as such, it might be seen as representing a compromise between competing interests.

The Eichmann trial had undoubtedly presented the Israeli government with a unique opportunity to harness media attention for pursuing concrete political and ideological goals. On the declarative level, there was a clear intention on the part of politicians to use the trial for political ends. But the extensive rhetoric was met with much less extensive practice, as Israeli public relations officers were in some cases unwilling and in others unable to carry it out. Suffering from a rather limited understanding of modern mass media, public relations officers focused mainly on the printed press and much less on the broadcasting media and on local coverage. Although Kol Yisrael was the main publicity medium in the hands the Israeli government, little attention had been given to radio as a means for influencing public opinion. It was only weeks into the trial that radio's impact became evident and even then no significant steps were taken to enhance or even sustain that impact. This oversight joins other incidents which may have had a similarly undermining effect—the problematic deal with Capital Cities, the refusal to allow television transmission to Tel Aviv venues, and the exclusion of Kol Yisrael from the interministerial publicity committee, to name but a few. Thus while politicians and officials were invoking the trial as imperative to the education of the young generation, only little had been done on the publicity front to achieve that end. It would be safe to assume that had there been an ideological master plan behind this trial—as some critics following Arendt's thesis seem to suggest—it would have probably included a more coherent public relations strategy.

From the perspective of radio's producers, the trial of Adolf Eichmann presented an exceptional challenge, both technical and professional. Kol Yisrael had played a key role in the technical preparation for the trial from its early stages, particularly in providing equipment and technical support to the foreign networks as well as in undertaking the recording of the proceedings. As Israel's exclusive broadcasting medium, Kol Yisrael's main effort went into the production of the daily diary *Yoman Ha'mishpat*. Aired immediately following the evening news, the broadcast claimed much resources and personnel from the station's regular activities. Live broadcasts from the courtroom were eagerly listened to, and had a resounding effect on the Israeli public. This popularity, however, was not a result of frequent live transmission; as this study reveals, such broadcasts had been relatively scarce during the months of the trial. Kol Yisrael's policy on live transmission was largely inconsistent: being

dependent on the Ministry of Justice and on other sources for information about the trial's course and topics, radio producers could rarely decide on live transmissions ahead of time. Moreover, these transmissions had to be thoroughly justified as they entailed the cancellation of hours of prescheduled programs. These constraints hardly allowed for continuous real time coverage, and may explain why, despite ongoing requests for additional broadcasts, such occasions remained sporadic. It may very well be the case that scarcity was precisely what contributed to their effect, for had radio transmission been more extensive the result might have been public apathy or withdrawal. All in all, it seems that Kol Yisrael's success had more to do with circumstance than design, owing mostly to its status in Israeli media environment at the time, to its exclusivity in covering the trial, and to the massive impact of its live broadcasts.

Notes

- 1 Gideon Hausner, *Justice in Jerusalem* (New York, 1966), 309.
- 2 In 1961, 79.6% of Israeli families and 82.6% of Jewish families owned at least one radio set. This is in a time when only 50.2% owned an electric refrigerator and 15.5% had an electric gramophone. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1963*, 202–203.
- 3 Tamar Liebes, 'Acoustic space: the role of radio in Israeli collective history', *Jewish History*, 20 (2006), 60–90; Derek Jonathan Pensler, 'Transmitting culture: radio in Israel', *Jewish Social Studies*, 10(1) (2003), 1–29. Several media scholars have noted the role of radio in the formation of nationhood, see for example: Elihu Katz and George Weddell, *Broadcasting in the Third World* (Cambridge, 1977); Daniel J. Czitrom, *Media and the American Mind* (Chappell Hill, 1982); Andrew Crisell, *Understanding Radio* (London, 1986); David Cardiff and Paddy Scannell, 'Broadcasting and national unity' in J. Curran, A. Smith and P. Wingate (eds) *Impacts and Influences* (London, 1987); Paddy Scannell, *A Social History of British Broadcasting, 1922–1939: serving the nation* (Oxford, 1991); Paddy Scannell, *Radio, Television & Modern Life* (Oxford, 1996); Susan Douglas, *Listening In: radio and the American imagination* (Minneapolis, 1999).
- 4 Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil* (New York, 1965).
- 5 See Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: the Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York, 2000), 350–351; Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood* (Cambridge, 2005), 92; Shoshana Felman, *The Judicial Unconscious: trials and traumas in the twentieth century* (New Haven, 2002), 127; Omer Bartov, *Mirrors of Destruction: war, genocide and modern identity* (Oxford, 2002), 281; Hanna Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann* (New York, 2004), 60–61, 196; Dalia Ofer, 'The strength of remembrance: commemorating the Holocaust during the first decade of Israel', *Jewish Social Studies*, 2(2) (2000), 49; Judith Stern, 'The Eichmann trial and its influence on psychiatry and psychology', *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, 1(2) (2000), 31; Gulie Ne'eman Arad, 'Israel and the Shoah: a tale of multifarious taboos', *New German Critique* 90 (2003), 12–13; Anita Shapira, 'The Eichmann trial: changing perspectives', *The Journal of Israeli History*, 23(1) (2004), 20.

- 6 Internal briefing to Israeli consulates April 16, 1961, p. 7, Israel State Archive (hereafter ISA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3352/9. Consulates were instructed that the briefing was off the record and its content was not to be publicized in any way. Participants included: David Landor, Director of the Government Press Office, Haim Yachil, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Gideon Hausner, Attorney General and chief prosecutor in the Eichmann trial.
- 7 Arendt, 4.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 5. For an early critique of Arendt's views, see Jacob Robinson, *And the Crooked Shall be Made Straight: the Eichmann trial, the Jewish catastrophe, and Hannah Arendt's narrative* (New York, 1965).
- 9 Hausner, *Justice in Jerusalem*, 291
- 10 *Ibid.*, 292.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 Internal briefing to Israeli consulates, p. 13
- 14 Transcript of Lecturers Conference, May 18, 1961, Information Center at the Prime Minister's Office, ISA GL/1638/907/3.
- 15 The trial which came to be known as the 'Kasztner Trial' had originated in Kasztner's lawsuit against Malkiel Grunwald, a Jerusalem journalist who published a pamphlet accusing him of being a Nazi collaborator. According to Grunwald, Kasztner had negotiated the release of Hungarian Jews while favoring his own relatives and friends, and in addition alleged him of testifying for SS officer Kurt Becher during the Nuremberg Trials, thereby saving him from accusation of war crimes. Kasztner's libel action quickly developed into political allegation against the Mapai ruling party, of which he was a member. Judge Halevi delivered his verdict on June 22, 1955, finding Grunwald's accusations against Kasztner justified. In 1958, the Supreme Court rejected Halevi's verdict. However, vindication came too late for Kasztner: on March 3, 1957 he was shot by three former members of the Lechi (radical right-wing) underground.
- 16 Yechiam Weitz, 'The Holocaust on trial: the impact of the Kasztner and Eichmann trials on Israeli society', *Israel Studies*, 1(2) (1996), 20.
- 17 Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann*, 86–87.
- 18 Ben Gurion to Hausner, March 28, 1961, quoted in Yablonka, 86
- 19 Hausner, *Justice in Jerusalem*, 289.
- 20 Recently declassified CIA records show that the U.S. was aware that West Germany had information on Eichmann's whereabouts as early as 1958 but chose to keep it secret, fearing that his capture might lead to embracing revelations about Hans Globke, an ex-Nazi who was Adenauer's security adviser and main contact person with American intelligence. See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/secondworldwar/story/0,,1792065,00.html>; <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=723756&contrassID=1&subContrassID=1>. According to Yablonka, Israeli Mossad had concrete information on Eichmann in 1959; this is after a period of reluctance on the part of the Israeli authorities to pursue the issue further (*ibid.*, 15–16).
- 21 Segev, *The Seventh Million: the Israelis and the Holocaust*, 343.
- 22 Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann*, 56; Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil*, 4.

- 23 Landor to Kollek, June 2, 1960, ISA, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657.
- 24 Zinder to Landor, June 15, 1960, ISA, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657. This is following an earlier memo sent by Zinder to Minister of Justice Pinchas Rosen on May 25, asking to permit Kol Yisrael to record the entire trial for the benefit of 'commemorating the trial on tapes that will be kept for generations to come'.
- 25 Givton to Keren, November 8, 1960, ISA, Broadcasting Authority, Eichmann File 405.
- 26 'Though I fail to see the benefit that will come from this recording, I agree to your request', Keren to Kollek, February 13, 1961, ISA, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657. This was probably linked to a bureaucratic tug-of-war between Keren and Givton: the former had requested that the latter release two of his employees, Gad Levi and Rafi Sidor, for conducting simultaneous translation of the proceedings; the latter had refused for lack of manpower (Keren to Shapira, November 2, 1960; Keren to Kollek, November 10, ISA, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657). Following Keren's consent, Levi and Sidor were allowed to participate in the trial.
- 27 This fact is revealed in a letter sent by Kollek to Keren, February 10, 1961, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657.
- 28 Landor to Kollek, June 2, 1960, ISA Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657.
- 29 Landor to Arnon, October 26, 1960, ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/4.
- 30 Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann*, 56.
- 31 Rosen to Yachil, October 26, 1960, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ISA, HZ/3351/4.
- 32 Yablonka, 56.
- 33 Hausner, *Justice in Jerusalem*, 307.
- 34 Quoted in Yablonka, 57.
- 35 Details revealed in an investigative report on the coverage of the trial published in *Yediot Ahronot*, May 19, 1961, 9.
- 36 Hagen to Meir, October 26, 1960, ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/4.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Givton to Gillieron, November 14, 1960, ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/4.
- 39 *Yediot Ahronot*, 9.
- 40 Givton to Gillieron, *ibid.*
- 41 Proposal as presented in a letter from Frank to Comay, November 30, 1960 ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/43.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Telegram to Landor (date not specified) signed jointly by James A. Hagerty Vice President ABC News, John Day Vice President CBS News and Julian Goodman Vice President NBC News, ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/4.
- 44 Arnon to Yachil, December 6, 1960, ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/4.
- 45 Zinder to Gerald Adler NBC International, January 3, 1961, ISA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HZ/3351/4 804/13/3.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Resolutions of a meeting at the Ministry of Justice, January 27, 1961, ISA, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657. Among the participants were Minister of Justice Pinchas Rosen, chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner, Prime Minister's bureau chief

Teddy Kollek, Director General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Haim Yachil, Head of Central Information Office Zvi (Harry) Zinder, and Director of Government Press Office, David Landor.

- 48 *Haaretz*, April 24, 1961, 1; *Yediot Ahronot*, August 27, 1961, 5.
- 49 *Herut*, April 25, 1961, 2; *Haaretz*, June 27, 1961, 2.
- 50 Itzchak Agadati, manager of Geva Studios, to Teddy Kollek, February 2, 1961, ISA, Prime Minister's Office, G/6384 I/3657. Four major Israeli studios went as far as appealing to the Supreme Court in order to contest the government's decision, but their motion was dismissed (information as revealed in a letter of studios managers to Abba Eben, April 3, 1961, ISA, Ministry of Education, GL/3/907).
- 51 *Radio 22*, March 31, 1961, 7.
- 52 On a more anecdotal note, it is indicated that 1000 magnetic tapes were purchased for the documentation of the trial, 5600 meters of tape were to be used every day, and 13,000 US Dollars was the price of the equipment ordered especially for trial broadcasting.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 55 Kol Yisrael memorandum 'Facilities for Sound-Radio Correspondents' (no date indicated), ISA, Broadcasting Service, File 405.
- 56 *Radio*, 7.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 58 Media events, according to Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, are historic occasions that are televised as they take place and transfix a nation or the world—the Olympic Games, Anwar el-Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, the funeral of J.F. Kennedy, the landing on the moon, the royal wedding of Charles and Diana, to name a few examples. Media events are usually about contest (sports and politics), conquest (moon landing), or coronation (a royal wedding). See *Media Events: the live broadcasting of history* (Cambridge, 1992). While media events often relate to television, it is possible to view the Eichmann trial as a radiocast event, which may be typified as a contest, as it involved a court battle, but may also be considered as a conquest, for displaying a groundbreaking achievement.
- 59 *Radio*, 10.
- 60 See, Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, 111.
- 61 Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: the Israelis and the Holocaust*, 350.
- 62 Shoshana Felman, *The Judicial Unconscious: trials and traumas in the twentieth century*, 127.
- 63 Idith Zertal, *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, 92.
- 64 Anita Shapira, 'The Eichmann trial: changing perspectives', 20.
- 65 Israel Broadcasting Service, 'Operation Trial: Memo no. 1', February 12, 1961, ISA, Ministry of Education GL/6863/7.
- 66 The decision not to hold sessions on Sunday (which is a normal weekday in Israel) was probably taken to accommodate non-Jewish personnel involved in the trial. The result was a court schedule that was somewhat foreign to the local custom but conducive to visitors and overseas observers, including worldwide media.
- 67 Minutes of Kol Yisrael meeting, 'Eichmann Trial', April 5, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405.

- 68 *Radio*, 9. Ari Avner, former Kol Yisrael correspondent to the U.N, was the executive producer of courtroom broadcasts. Producers of *Yoman Ha'mishpat* were Yoram Ronen and Hagay Pinsker.
- 69 'Eichmann Trial—Changes in Program Schedule', February 5, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405.
- 70 Minutes of Kol Yisrael meeting: 'Eichmann Trial', April 5, 1961. ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405.
- 71 Kollek to Givton, April 10, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405.
- 72 Transcript of Lecturers Conference, May 18, 1961, ISA, Ministry of Education, GL/1638/907/3. Other participants included Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Haim Yachil, chief superintended Avraham Zelinger (head of Bureau 06, the police unit that investigated Eichmann) and chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner. Since the latter was appearing in court, participants were firmly instructed not to quote his address in their talks.
- 73 *Ibid.*, 1.
- 74 Kol Yisrael press communiqué, April 10, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405.
- 75 Eichmann Trial Staff Meeting, April 30, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405.
- 76 Personal communication, Nakdimon Rogel, March 25, 2003.
- 77 ISA holds many letters from listeners complaining about the broadcasting of music immediately following live transmissions, denouncing such incidents as shameful. It is possible that such criticism ruled out any intention to utilize Ha'gal Ha'kal for live broadcasts.
- 78 In a letter to Kol Yisrael's Director General, Nakdimon Rogel reproves the lack of professionalism exhibited by some presenters who, according to him, failed to read updates, arrange music transitions and adequately monitor the transmission. Still worse was that reporters ignored broadcasting protocol by taking the liberty of adding their narration during court recesses. Rogel indicates that such misconduct was not sporadic (Rogel to Givton, May 30, 1961, ISA GL/6863/9).
- 79 Central Bureau of Statistics, 'Listening Survey to the First Two Sessions of the Eichmann Trial', April 25, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 405/0423.
- 80 All headlines are from the aforementioned newspapers, April 12, 1961.
- 81 *Haaretz*, April 12, 1961.
- 82 *Ibid.*
- 83 Listener Shifra Halstoch to Kol Yisrael, April 27, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 4051.
- 84 Listener Eliyahu Ferbstein to Hausner, April 30, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 4051. Emphasis in the original.
- 85 Listener Devora Bushinski to Kol Yisrael, April 14, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 4051.
- 86 ISA files hold 139 letters, 83 of which are from Israelis and the rest from listeners abroad.
- 87 From Hedva Rotem to Ruth Krumer, August 8, 1961, ISA, Israel Broadcasting Service, File 4051. The same number is repeated in another letter, sent August 1, 1961 to listener Shoshana Merd. Despite extensive search in ISA files, no transmission logs were found, nor any evidence of the existence of such logs.

- 88 Estimate includes the live broadcast of August 9, which is indicated in Hedva Rotem's letter of the previous day; as well as the broadcasting of at least one session on May 29, 1962, the day Eichmann's appeal was rejected by the High Court of Justice, as indicated in Rogel to Givton, May 30, 1961, ISA GL/6863/9.

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